PREVair - 5
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Writings Environment PREVair - 5

Annex 5

Lessons learned

  • need a bank with strong local roots (not necessarily locally owned), with strong pre-existing relationship to small businesses
  • commitment from top management from the bank is crucial
  • cross-sectoral partnership between NGO, bank, private sector and all levels of governments necessary to create sense of ownership, to create a check-and-balance mechanism and prevent cronyism
  • commitment from all members of the Committee of Experts is crucial (since they receive no external compensation for pay their own travel and time)
  • the right of veto of each member organization creates trust and a sense of ownership by the stakeholders
  • preparatory technical assistance by eco-counsellor is essential
  • slackening of demand after a few years may be a problem because of market saturation
  • programme is reinforced by working within a larger context which includes close work with professional associations, simplified environmental assessments, eco-diagnostics, eco-guides etc.

Further questions

Is the success of the programme dependent on the size and type of the bank (i.e. small to medium-sized bank, co-operative structure)? Or is it enough that the bank, whatever its size, be closely integrated in the local economic tissue? Is a locally-owned and managed bank the best?

(It looks as if strong local involvement, knowledge and integration within the local business community, and a strong local pre-existing small business portfolio is enough.  These aspects are not necessarily unique to local ownership or co-operative structure, but may be correlated.  So local ownership and co-operative structure may be a indicator of probable success.)

Are the cost of funds of the bank comparatively lower than other banks (e.g. because of co-operative structure or other factors )?

Why is the bank willing to forgo their usual profit margin in exchange of less tangible benefits? What is the part of responsibility or influence of the NGO, and of the mindset of the bank managers?

Is it possible to quantify these less tangible benefits? Is there hard evidence for increased customer loyalty to the bank?

Is the overall economic and social environment of Alsace a necessary condition for the success of PREVair or just another positive ("nice-to-have"-type) enabling factor?

Is it possible to quantify the lifetime environmental benefits of the scheme?

How does PREVair manage to alleviate the fears of SMEs to give sensitive data which will be accessible to the regulatory agencies sitting in the Committee of Experts?

Report for US AID

Questions from Troy Davis to Theodore Panayotou, Director, Harvard Institute for International Development

1.  when you spoke of the regulatory risk, you exclusively used the expression of environmental regulations, did you in fact mean to say the regulatory environment in general, or did you actually mean to restrict your remarks to environmental regulations?

private operators require strong regulatory regime (instead of regulatory commission?)

2.  have you estimated also health costs of especially lack of clean water and sanitation? might add a strong argument to the ones you have already have by showing that investment in water and sanitation is even more attractive when externalities such as improved health are included.

3.  said that 1 B no water, 2 B no sanitation, 4 B no solid waste.  If so, why not concentrate more funding on solid waste, which incidentally might have a synergistic effect on improving water supply because of reduced ground water pollution due to leachates from solid waste?

4.  have you estimated cost of corruption on infrastructure investments, and do you see any positive effect arising from the recent signature of the OECD anti-corruption agreement.

[PREVair - 2] [PREVair - 3] [PREVair - 4] [PREVair - 5]

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